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ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

In this article, I explore how race, class, and migration inﬂuence Latino
household wealth, and uncover important implications for the close
2016 US presidential election outcome in Florida. I follow over
11,000 homeowners in the Orlando area of Orange County, Florida
from 2004 to 2016. To proxy for immigrant incorporation, I leverage
matched voter registration records and direct observation of
borrower identiﬁcation – driver’s license, green card/passport, or
undocumented identiﬁcation. Documented immigrants appear least
vulnerable to foreclosure; multivariate analyses show that Latinos
with undocumented identiﬁcation are most vulnerable. Foreclosure
and negative equity predict decreases in voter activity among
Latino Democrats and Latino Independents, respectively, but not
among Latino Republicans. I conﬁrm this pattern at the precinctlevel using data on all Orange County voters. Across Florida,
county-level Latino foreclosures and lagging home prices
correspond to a decline in the Democratic presidential vote from
2012 to 2016. My analysis reveals the mechanisms that erase Latino
home equity and how the loss of wealth may have played a role in
ﬂipping Florida from a blue state to a red state.

Latinos; wealth; immigration;
housing; voting; Florida

In the recent U.S. housing crisis, Latino household wealth plummeted by nearly twothirds, more than any other group (Maroto 2016; Taylor et al. 2011). Latino homeowners
experienced foreclosure most often, especially in the rapidly-growing Sunbelt states of
Arizona, Florida, and Nevada (Hall, Crowder, and Spring 2015b; Reid et al. 2017; Rugh
2015a). By 2013, 23% of Latino homeowners lost their homes to foreclosure, compared
to 19% of Blacks, 11% of Asians, and 9% of Non-Hispanic Whites (Reid et al. 2017). A
constellation of factors – low initial wealth, immigration, risky loans, discriminatory practices, and crashing home prices – pushed foreclosures and negative equity to record levels,
and drained the primary source of Latino household assets (Keister, Vallejo, and Smith
2015; McConnell 2008; Painter and Qian 2015; Rugh 2015a; Rugh and Massey 2010).
After an uneven recovery, median White family wealth remains 8 times that of Latino
families and 10 times that of Black families (Lei et al. 2017). Compared to the deep scholarship on the Black–White wealth gap (e.g. Conley 2010; Killewald 2013; Oliver and Shapiro
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2006; Sharkey 2013), the mechanisms behind the Latino-White wealth gap seem less clear
(McConnell 2008; Vallejo and Keister 2019). Home equity shapes household fortunes and
the social mobility of future generations (Keister and Moller 2000). However, to what
extent does the dramatic loss of wealth among Latinos reverberate beyond the walls of
their homes? In this article, I explore how race, class, and migration inﬂuence foreclosures
and home equity among the fast-growing and diverse Latino population of the Orlando,
Florida region. I uncover mechanisms that jeopardise Latino ownership, home equity, and
social mobility and argue that the loss of Latino wealth matters to broader society because
it helped play a role shifting the US presidential election outcome in Florida from 2012 to
2016.

Orlando, Florida study setting
The Orlando area is an important context to study Latino housing wealth for three
reasons. First, like Las Vegas and Phoenix, Orlando epitomises the housing boom and
bust (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz 2008). The crisis dragged on longer in Orlando than elsewhere, especially in communities of colour (Kim and Cho 2016; Raymond, Wang, and
Immergluck 2016). Partly due to the diversity of the state’s Latino population, the
impacts in Florida diﬀer from other regions, but remain understudied (see Cahill and
Franklin 2013; Kim and Cho 2016; Strom and Reader 2013 for exceptions). Second,
Orlando exempliﬁes the impending national demographic transformation to a more
multi-ethnic and Hispanic suburban majority (Frey 2018). Third, Orlando remains at
the centre of the swing region in Florida – the swing state with the most electoral votes.
In 2016, Florida became a red state for the ﬁrst time since 2004. The margin of victory
was as narrow as in 2012 – about 1% of votes cast.
Since 2000, the Orlando metro area has become majority-minority (Frey 2018).
Orlando became an emerging immigrant gateway, many from South America and
South Asia (Singer 2004). The foreign born population of the Orlando metro area
doubled from 2000 to 2014 (Singer 2015). The Orlando area Latino population more
than doubled, from 168,000 in 2000 to over 401,000 in 2016, and the Latino population
share rose from 19% to 31% (US Census Bureau 2017). Unlike the rest of the US,
where nearly two in three Latinos are Mexican origin, the South American origin population is larger in Orange County. While the population of Mexican origin Latinos
doubled between 2000 and 2016, the Colombian population quadrupled. Unlike South
Florida, Cuban Americans comprise less than 10% of area Latinos.
The diversity of the Latino population in Orange County is punctuated by the fact
that half of Latinos are Puerto Rican (US Census Bureau 2017).1 Compared to Puerto
Ricans in New York, Puerto Ricans in the Orlando region are more likely to self-identify
as White, live above the poverty line, and own their own homes (Duany 2010; Duany
and Rodríguez 2006; Massey and Constant 2017). However, Puerto Ricans still remain
disadvantaged compared to other Latino sub-populations. The net worth of Puerto
Ricans is far lower than that of Cubans and native born Mexican Americans, and
roughly comparable to that of ﬁrst-generation Mexican immigrants (Keister, Vallejo,
and Borelli 2015). Puerto Rican exceptionalism has been attributed to their residential
segregation and racial stratiﬁcation that resemble the experiences of African Americans
more than other Hispanics (Massey and Denton 1993). However, the recent large-scale
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migration of Puerto Ricans to the South, mainly to Florida, led to a divergence from
Blacks in the housing recovery (Kuebler and Rugh 2013). Because Orlando is more integrated and features a diverse Latino co-ethnic base, home ownership may be more stable
among some Latinos (Flippen 2010). Whether the axis of diﬀerentiation hinges on race,
ethnicity, class, nativity, or immigrant legal status is an empirical question I seek to
answer in my analysis.
The ﬁnal reason Orlando is ideal is to examine potential links between housing wealth
and election outcomes across Florida. This rationale is illustrated by the compelling patterns across the maps in Figure 1. Panel A depicts the standardised change in home prices
since 2004 for all Florida counties with available data. Panel B depicts the percentage point
change from 2012 to 2016 in the Democratic share of the two-party vote total, using the
same standardised scale.
The housing market recovery across Florida counties is highly variable and corresponds
closely to the geographic variation in ﬂuctuations in election outcomes. Unlike other
states, lagging home prices and prolonged foreclosure timelines meant the crisis lingered
beyond 2012 in Florida. In the more urban counties of Florida’s largest cities, especially in
Central and South Florida, the housing market gained relative to 2004 and the Democratic
vote share held steady or increased relative to 2012. In Orange County (Orlando), home
prices rose 16.5% above 2004 levels, and the Democratic vote share increased by 6.4 points.
In contrast, across the more sparsely populated, less diverse, exurban and rural counties in
the Panhandle and in between South and Central Florida, the housing market recovery
was weak to nonexistent, and the Democratic vote share plummeted. In outlying
exurban Hernando County, north of Tampa and coloured in red, home prices fell 6.3%
since 2004 and the Democratic vote share tumbled by 20.5 points from 2012 to 2016.
This correlation may be spurious. Even if the link is robust to rival explanations, such
evidence does not explain why the crisis inﬂuences the election outcome, nor the role
of Latino household wealth.

Figure 1. Change in home prices and change presidential vote by Florida County. Note: Empty counties
(in white) missing home price data. Data sources: Federal home ﬁnance agency, Florida division of elections. Maps created by Author.
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Contemporary Latino residential stratiﬁcation and racial incorporation
Household wealth stratiﬁes access to home ownership, which reproduces wealth attainment and inequality. In the United States, ownership is stratiﬁed primarily by race.
Black and Latino homeowners have less home equity than similarly situated White
owners (Krivo and Kaufman 2004). Nationality, nativity, immigrant status, and skin
tone also inﬂuence household wealth and reinforce the salience of race (Allen 2011;
Emeka 2019; McConnell and Akresh 2013; Painter and Qian 2015; Salgado and Ortiz
2019; Tesfai 2017). Legal permanent residents are among the most advantaged recent
immigrants in terms of home equity (McConnell and Akresh 2013). Among advantaged
immigrants, disparities in income and wealth by skin tone and race still persist due colorism and racism (Goldsmith, Hamilton, and Darity 2007; Painter and Qian 2016). Discriminatory processes may racialize ostensibly nonracial social categories like immigrant
legal status. The racially disparate pattern of immigrant deportation that limits Latino
access to housing wealth for mixed legal status families, regardless of their individual
legal status, is one example (Dreby 2015; Golash-Boza 2015; López 2015; Rugh and
Hall 2016; Vallejo 2012).
What recent trends in Latino housing outcomes portend for the racial location of
Latinos in future society remains contested (McConnell 2008; Tienda and Fuentes
2014). Based on intergenerational gains in home ownership, suburbanisation, and educational attainment, Latinos may trace an upward residential path toward racial incorporation into a white mainstream (Alba 2009; Myers 2007; Park and Myers 2010).
Alternatively, an immigrant threat narrative may racialize Latinos, regardless of generational or legal status (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015; Chavez 2013; Massey,
Durand, and Pren 2016). Ethnicity, language, external ascription, racial ideology, and
homeownership may mediate racial trajectories across the life course of Latinos. These
conditions dictate when and to what degree Latinos see themselves as racialized by
others and how they view their own racial status (Dowling 2014; Vallejo 2012; Vargas
2015).
In sum, the racial incorporation path Latinos will follow may be upward (Alba 2009),
downward (Massey 2007), blocked (Telles and Ortiz 2008), delayed (Brown 2007), segmented (Portes and Zhou 1993), or already ended at a new destination distinctive from
both the historical Black and White experiences (Golash-Boza 2006; Flores-González
2017). Given the diversity of the Latino population in Florida, these trajectories may
co-exist and reinforce one another.

The link between foreclosures and voter outcomes
Existing research ﬁnds moderate eﬀects of foreclosures or negative equity and voter
turnout and vote choice, depending on the context. In a national analysis, Hall, Yoder,
and Karandikar (2017, 2) report ‘precisely estimated null eﬀects’ of county-level foreclosure rates on incumbent voter shares across the 2004–2016 general elections. For individual voters in federal elections in Ohio over the same period, foreclosure at least 90 days
prior to election reduces turnout by 4.6 percentage points and foreclosure within 30
days reduces turnout by 8.2 points (Hall, Yoder, and Karandikar 2017). Hall, Yoder,
and Karandikar (2017) ﬁnd that the eﬀects of foreclosure in the 2016 election were
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more pronounced; nationwide, one additional foreclosure per 1,000 people reduced the
county-level Democratic 2016 vote share by 0.8 to 1.8 percentage points.2
Other analyses are conﬁned to a certain election year. In their examination of population-based credit reporting data for all California borrowers, Healy and Lenz (2017)
document a strong positive eﬀect of increased zip code mortgage delinquencies from
2006 to 2008 on the zip code Democratic (Obama) vote share in the 2008 election.
Related analyses of voting patterns in California ﬁnd that zip code foreclosure rates are
associated with modest, yet statistically signiﬁcant, decreases in voter turnout at both
the neighbourhood and the individual level in the 2008 presidential election (EstradaCorrea and Johnson 2012). Likewise, among North Carolina voters in the 2010 election,
McCartney (2017) uncovers a slightly stronger association between declining home
prices and decreases in voter participation.
None of the existing scholarship examines estimates the interactive eﬀects of foreclosure by race. However, mortgage distress may have indirect eﬀects on voter participation
related for residential, psychological, and economic reasons, each with a potential racially
uneven impact. First, foreclosures also entail residential instability (Hall, Crowder, and
Spring 2015a), which pose barriers to voter registration. Such instability may reduce the
likelihood of voting because foreclosed owners are likely to be renters, who are less
likely to vote than homeowners (Fischel 2001). Indeed, foreclosed homes in minority
neighbourhoods in Orlando are more likely to become rental properties than foreclosed
homes in White neighbourhoods (Kim and Cho 2016). The decrease in home ownership
in communities of colour and shift to rental occupancy thus further compounds decreases
in Democratic turnout because renters are less likely to vote – and because Black and
Latino voters are more likely to be Democrats (Florida Division of Elections 2017).
Moreover, homeowners who are dissatisﬁed are signiﬁcantly more likely to be mobilised
and vote compared to other homeowners and after controlling for confounders that
explain diﬀerences from renter voters (Holian 2011). Thus, aﬄuent white homeowners
who be underwater on their mortgages but not still owners nonetheless may be more
likely to vote.
Second, the housing crisis and ensuing recession eroded trust in institutions, including
the federal government (Owens and Cook 2013; Ross and Squires 2011). Such loss of trust
may also depress participation in federal elections. Because Black and Latino owners were
more aﬀected by deceptive lending practices and ensuing foreclosures, this may lower trust
and reduce voter turnout. Third, foreclosures may aﬀect participation and vote choice in
federal elections because voters evaluate national economic conditions based on local
factors, including foreclosure rates, even if they themselves have not experienced foreclosure (Reeves and Gimpel 2012). Reeves and Gimpel (2012) ﬁnd that higher local foreclosure rates in 2008 correspond to signiﬁcantly more negative assessments of the national
economy on the eve of the presidential election; the eﬀect is more pronounced among
new residents and in states like Florida where foreclosure rates surged for the ﬁrst time
(unlike Michigan, where foreclosures rose earlier). Partisanship may bias such evaluations
of local conditions. Rogers (2016) ﬁnds Tea Party movement aﬃliation is associated with
more negative evaluations of local economic conditions, regardless of objective indicators
and a host of individual and local factors. Interestingly, in their examination of election
cycles over the past four decades, Healy and Malhotra (2013) ﬁnd that the eﬀects of partisan bias are more pronounced when economic performance is closer to average and
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allows for more disagreement. Accordingly, diﬀerential partisan response to foreclosure
should be greater in 2016 than in 2008, when the housing market was in freefall.
Because party registration varies by race, diﬀerential partisan responses would imply
diﬀerential racial responses. Crucially, Latinos exhibit greater variation in racial identiﬁcation and partisan registration than Black voters. Conservative ideology is a signiﬁcant
predictor of White self-identiﬁcation among Latinos, even controlling for skin tone and
other traits (e.g. Dowling 2014; Vargas 2015). Thus, I should expect a possible partisan
split in turnout patterns among Latino voters in their response to foreclosure and diminished equity, which raises two intriguing questions: First, do Latino Democrats respond
more like other Latinos or more like other (Black and White) Democrats? Second, do
Latino Republicans respond more like other Latinos or more like other (White)
Republicans?

Study design
Figure 2 diagrams a conceptual model of my hypothesised linkages between race, homeownership, wealth, and voting outcomes. These linkages guide my three related aims. First,
I seek to understand and measure the eﬀect of wealth, income, race, ethnicity, and particularly immigrant and noncitizen status on the risk of foreclosure and homeownership exit.
My second research aim is to understand the impact of lost wealth (foreclosure and home
equity) on patterns of voter activity among citizen homeowners by race and party registration. The third aim is to estimate the net statistical eﬀects of any such racial-partisan
diﬀerences in foreclosures, negative equity, and voter inactivity on the shift in the Democratic vote share in the US presidential election in Orange County and across all Florida
counties.
My unique panel dataset of over 9,000 homeowners from 2004 to 2016 contains a rich
array of variables that facilitate my research aims (Rugh and Allen 2015; Rugh 2015b). I
use linear probability models to estimate the eﬀects of race, initial wealth, and immigrant
incorporation on foreclosure and the loss of wealth, negative equity (underwater mortgage). I leverage direct observation of borrower identiﬁcation – driver’s license, green
card/passport, or undocumented identiﬁcation. Linking to voter records, I estimate the

Figure 2. Conceptual model of mortgaged home ownership, wealth, and voter participation.
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interactive eﬀects of race, party registration, foreclosure status, and negative equity on
voter activity for over 5,000 matched voters. I collapse my data to the precinct-level to
uncover mechanisms that document a link between housing outcomes and swings in
the election results. Finally, I test the links adduced from the individual-level and precinct-level analyses at the county-level to see whether they prevail across Florida net of
rival explanations.

Data sources
The primary data are 11,377 digitally scanned ﬁrst lien home mortgage loans made available by the Orange County, Florida recorder, hereafter OCR. Records were collected by
way of a lender-based census of all 9,792 loans originated in 2005 and 2006 by three
national lenders (Rugh and Allen 2015). To sample lenders and immigrant homeowners,
records based on searches for common Hispanic and Asian surnames were later added
(Rugh 2015b). This supplement included 1,585 borrowers from 2004 to 2007. The OCR
data feature linked loan outcomes observed through 2016: prepaid, modiﬁed, foreclosed,
or completed foreclosure.3 The OCR data were merged to records of all originated mortgages in Orange County disseminated under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (FFIEC
2006, 2011), which resulted in 9,618 ﬁrst-lien matched loans. To investigate the implications for voting, individual-level voter registration data as of December 2015 from the
Orange County, Florida Supervisor of Elections (OCE) were also merged (N = 5,150).4

Methods
I utilise diﬀerent approaches at three diﬀerent levels of analysis: individual borrowers,
Orange County voter precincts, and Florida counties. I examine the bivariate associations
among variables of conceptual interest: race, immigration status, class, foreclosure, home
equity, and voter outcomes. I explore whether any associations persist after accounting for
other factors using multivariate models. Following my conceptual model, I estimate four
outcomes: (1) borrower completed foreclosure, (2) voter inactive status, (3) precinct-level
and (4) county-level net shift in Democratic vote share. To facilitate variable interactions
and cross-model comparisons, I use ordinary least squares instead of logistic regression to
estimate linear probability models for discrete outcomes (Mood 2010).5
I employ three measures to operationalise race, ethnicity, and immigrant and civic
incorporation. To create a ﬁnal race/ethnicity variable, I ﬁrst use the OCE registered
voter self-reported race (Hispanic separate race), followed by the matched HMDA race/
ethnicity (Hispanic any race), and then the US Census surname imputation variables
(see the online supplement). To proxy for immigrant integration, the identiﬁcation
types were divided into three categories: driver’s license (N = 8,414), foreign passport/
Legal Permanent Resident (green) card (N = 121), and other forms of identiﬁcation (N
= 845, including blank entries, N = 229). The driver’s license category was cross-referenced
with voter registration data and re-classiﬁed as registered voters (N = 4,429, 47%) and
unregistered voters with driver’s licenses (N = 3,985, 42%).
Several diﬀerent variables capture diﬀerences in income, wealth, and social class. Following Reid et al. (2017), I deﬁne a categorical variable based on the calculated ratio of
borrower household income to the annual area median income (AMI) for the Orlando
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area (low/moderate, middle, upper income). To proxy for wealth, I rely on a binary variable for simultaneous second loan receipt and two additional continuous variables that
capture home equity (constant $) and the original combined loan-to-value ratio
(OCLTV).6 Control variables were merged to the OCR-HMDA-OCE dataset at the zip
code and block group level and are described in the online supplement.

Descriptive statistics results
Completed foreclosure is a well-deﬁned event that erases the principal source of household
wealth. As Table 1 illustrates, foreclosure was not rare in the Orlando area: nearly one in
ﬁve sample borrowers who took out home loans in 2004–2007 lost their homes by 2016.
The diﬀerences in foreclosure by race and civic/immigrant integration are striking. Only
15% of White and Asian owners lost their homes, compared to 18% of Blacks and 27% of
Latinos. Compared to registered voters, foreclosure rates are signiﬁcantly higher among
owners with driver’s licenses but who are not registered to vote, regardless of race. The
sample sizes for documented immigrants with valid passports and Legal Permanent Residency (hereafter LPR or green cards) are small, but foreclosure rates for Latino documented immigrants are notably lower (20.5%, N = 44). Rates are elevated for borrowers with
no identiﬁcation and no voter registration, and signiﬁcantly higher among Latino borrowers (35.6%) compared to registered Latino voters. This residual identiﬁcation category
includes both documented owners with weak civic attachment and undocumented immigrants. A small, nontrivial fraction of homeowners may be undocumented (McConnell
2015; Rugh and Allen 2015; Zayas 2015).
Table 2 reports the estimates of median home equity by race and by civic/immigrant integration status at loan origination and termination or December 2016. The median borrower
had $36,978 in home equity at origination and −$8,552 by 2016. Although all lost equity in the
housing crash, the typical Black and Latino borrower began with a much smaller cushion and
ended up much worse oﬀ. Among White, Asian, and Latino borrowers, foreign nationals with
passports and documented immigrants with green cards (LPR) enjoyed the highest levels of
median initial equity, consistent with McConnell and Akresh (2013). By 2016, registered
voters with Driver’s licenses had the highest levels of home equity, except among Black borrowers. Latinos with no documented identiﬁcation stand out for their low levels of initial
equity, $11,500, and end equity, -$22,391.
Table 1. Completed foreclosure rates by identiﬁcation used to sign mortgage note, registered voter
status, and race of borrower: Orange County, FL, 2004–2007 loans as of December 2016.
Driver’s License,
Registered Voter
Driver’s License,
Not Registered Voter
Green Card, Passport,
Not Registered Voter
Other Identiﬁcation,
Not Registered Voter
Percent Foreclosed
N

NH White

NH Asian/Paciﬁc Islander

NH Black

Hispanic/Latino

Total

11.8%
1,861
19.2%***
1,632
18.2%
11
16.7%
162
15.3%
3,666

11.9%
421
17.2%*
640
12.5%
16
12.9%
62
14.9%
1,139

14.5%
691
24.1%***
457
20.0%
10
13.7%
51
18.1%
1,209

22.3%
1,430
30.4%***
1,475
20.5%
44
35.6%***
177
26.9%
3,126

15.6%
4,403
23.4%***
4,204
18.5%
81
23.2%***
452
19.6%
9,140

***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05 (two-tailed test of diﬀerence from Driver’s License/Registered Voter). See paper for data
sources.

JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES

9

Table 2. Median estimated home equity ($) at origination and end of loan by identiﬁcation type,
registered voter status, and race of borrower: Orange County, FL, 2004–2016.
Driver’s License,
Registered Voter
Driver’s License,
Not Registered Voter
Green Card, Passport, Not
Registered Voter
Other Identiﬁcation,
Not Registered Voter
Equity at Origination
Equity at End of Loan

NH White

NH Asian/Paciﬁc Islander

NH Black

Hispanic/Latino

Total

47,500
−1,556
35,513
−6,381
61,020
−25,810
39,500
−6,978
41,250
−3,618

48,678
7,891
45,000
2,321
55,900
206
49,750
1,609
46,563
4,825

35,625
−13,128
26,250
−18,544
12,425
−11,769
22,000
−9,860
31,958
−15,054

35,813
−11,276
21,420
−18,334
38,605
−17,179
11,500
−22,391
29,056
−15,357

40,500
−6,048
31,806
−11,315
42,620
−14,746
33,163
−12,523
36,978
−8,552

Note: See paper for data sources.

Multivariate analysis results
Table 3 reports the linear probability model (LPM) estimates of completed foreclosure, the
ﬁrst key outcome in my conceptual model (Figure 1). In the baseline speciﬁcation in
column (1), Latinos and Blacks are predicted to have statistically signiﬁcantly higher foreclosure rates compared to Whites, 11.6 percentage points (p < .001) and 2.8 points (p
< .05) higher, respectively. After adding the immigrant integration variable and lender
ﬁxed eﬀects to account for sample design, the Latino-White and Black–White gaps
remain signiﬁcant and essentially unchanged. Borrowers with driver’s licenses, but not
registered to vote (7.1 points, p < .001) and undocumented identiﬁcation (6.0 points, p
< .01) are signiﬁcantly more likely to lose their home to foreclosure than registered
voters. However, documented immigrants and LPRs are no less likely to complete
foreclosure.
After introducing the relevant borrower and loan controls in column (3) of Table 3 and
the block group controls and zip code home price change to the full model in column (4),
two key ﬁndings emerge. First, underwater borrowers are more likely to complete foreclosure (14.5 points, p < .001), especially Black and Latino borrowers. Net of other factors, the
gap in foreclosure between Latinos with negative equity and Whites with positive equity is
22.9 points (p < .001); the comparable Black–White gap is 19.9 points (p < .05). Second,
unregistered voters with driver’s licenses remain signiﬁcantly more likely to complete foreclosure, and the gap between registered voters and undocumented identiﬁcation borrowers is entirely driven by the interaction with Latino borrowers. In the full model,
the predicted gap in foreclosure rates between Latino borrowers without formal identiﬁcation or who may be undocumented and White borrowers registered to vote remains signiﬁcant and substantial, at 9.1 points (p < .05). Therefore, even when controlling for
marital status, income, home price changes, and other factors, Latino borrowers remain
most likely to complete foreclosure, partly due to low initial levels of equity (wealth)
and the higher incidence of undocumented identiﬁcation and possible unauthorised
immigrant status. Regardless of race, however, documented immigrants were not signiﬁcantly more likely to complete foreclosure.
What were the ramiﬁcations of foreclosure for the most incorporated group, registered
voters? Table 4 reports estimates of voter inactive status as of December 2015, just prior to
the 2016 presidential primaries and general election, the next key outcome in my conceptual model (Figure 1). The baseline speciﬁcation in column (1) includes race/ethnicity,
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Table 3. LPM estimates of completed foreclosure, Orange County, FL Sample, 2004–2016.
Race/Ethnicity
NH White (ref)
NH Asian/NHPI
NH Black
Hispanic/Latino

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–
−0.004
(0.012)
0.028*
(0.013)
0.116***
(0.010)

–
−0.014
(0.014)
0.027*
(0.012)
0.106***
(0.010)

–
0.009
(0.015)
−0.022*
(0.011)
0.002
(0.018)
0.130***
(0.018)
−0.001
(0.024)
0.045*
(0.020)
0.078***
(0.017)

–
0.003
(0.016)
−0.031**
(0.011)
−0.001
(0.018)
0.145***
(0.013)
0.004
(0.024)
0.054**
(0.021)
0.084***
(0.018)

–

–
0.071***
(0.022)
0.022
(0.045)
0.060**
(0.020)

–
0.044***
(0.008)
−0.015
(0.043)
−0.001
(0.020)
0.082*
(0.041)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
0.11
9,115
2.50

–
0.043***
(0.008)
−0.016
(0.043)
0.001
(0.020)
0.091*
(0.042)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.11
9,003
2.47

Underwater (Negative Equity)
NH Asian/NHPI * Underwater
NH Black * Underwater
Hispanic/Latino * Underwater
Immigrant Incorporation
Driver’s License, Registered Voter (ref)
Driver’s License, Not Registered Voter
Green Card/Foreign Passport
Other Identiﬁcation
Other ID * Hispanic Surname Borrower
Lender Fixed Eﬀects
Borrower & Loan Controls
Year of Origination Fixed Eﬀects
Census Block Group Controls
Zip Code Change in Home Values
R2
N
Mean VIF

No
No
No
No
No
0.02
9,397
1.08

Yes
No
No
No
No
0.03
9,397
1.21

OLS linear probability model coeﬃcients (robust standard errors) ***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05 (two-tailed tests) Borrower
& loan controls: Ratio of income to area median income (AMI) category, original combined Loan-to-Value ratio (OCLTV),
high cost subprime loan, loan purpose, occupancy, condominium property, amount of loan, Government-sponsored
Enterprise (GSE) purchased loan, loan type, adjustable rate (ARM), and prepayment penalty indicator. Census block
group controls: Percent Hispanic, percent foreign born, percent owner-occupied homes, percent of adults with a
college degree, and median year housing structure built. Lender ﬁxed eﬀects account for diﬀerent primary sample
lenders and a category for the surname sample supplement across all lenders. See paper text for data sources.

party registration, and foreclosure status. A racial gap in voter inactivity is signiﬁcant only
between Latinos and Whites, but is quite modest, at just 2.0 points (p < .05). There are no
diﬀerences by party. However, those in foreclosure are 4.6 points (p < .001) more likely to
become inactive voters than those who never enter foreclosure, regardless of race or party.
In column (2) of Table 4, an interaction of party registration with race is added to the
model of voter inactive status. Compared to White Republicans, Latino Democrats are the
only cross-classiﬁed group predicted to be inactive voters at a higher rate (5.6 points, p
< .01). The coeﬃcient on ever in foreclosure remains unchanged, implying a 4.6-point
gap (p < .001). In column (3), a three-way interaction of race, party, and ever in foreclosure
is introduced to the model along with controls for voter decade of birth and sex. The eﬀect
of the two-way interaction with Latino and Democratic voter status becomes insigniﬁcant
and the one-way eﬀect of foreclosure remains consistent at 4.6 points (p < .001). The only
three-way interaction that emerges as statistically signiﬁcant is the coeﬃcient associated
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Table 4. LPM Estimates of inactive voter status, matched sample in Orange County, 2015.
(1)
Race/Ethnicity
NH White (ref)
NH Asian/NHPI
NH Black
Hispanic/Latino
Party Registration
Republican Party (REP)
Other Party (OTH)
Democratic Party (DEM)

(4)

–
0.001
(0.018)
0.012
(0.041)
−0.009
(0.014)

–
−0.001
(0.019)
0.049
(0.060)
0.008
(0.017)

–
−0.007
(0.019)
0.047
(0.061)
0.004
(0.018)

–
0.018
(0.009)
0.006
(0.008)

–
0.020
(0.013)
−0.012
(0.010)
−0.018
(0.027)
0.013
(0.027)
0.001
(0.050)
−0.010
(0.042)
−0.010
(0.022)
0.056**
(0.019)

–
0.006
(0.013)
−0.006
(0.011)
−0.013
(0.027)
−0.013
(0.025)
0.007
(0.072)
−0.054
(0.061)
0.014
(0.026)
0.023
(0.022)

–
0.005
(0.014)
−0.006
(0.011)
−0.004
(0.027)
−0.006
(0.025)
0.008
(0.073)
−0.058
(0.062)
0.014
(0.026)
0.019
(0.023)

0.046*
(0.019)
−0.009
(0.074)
0.074
(0.070)
−0.038
(0.102)
0.106
(0.087)
−0.002
(0.050)
0.092*
(0.042)
Yes
No
.02
5,083

0.043*
(0.020)
0.006
(0.075)
0.088
(0.070)
−0.037
(0.103)
0.108
(0.087)
−0.002
(0.051)
0.099*
(0.043)
Yes
Yes
.03
5,083

NH Asian/NHPI * DEM
NH Black * OTH
NH Black * DEM
Hispanic/Latino * OTH
Hispanic/Latino * DEM
0.046***
(0.008)

0.046***
(0.008)

No
No
.01
5,083

No
No
.01
5,083

Foreclosure * NH Asian/NHPI * OTH
Foreclosure * NH Asian/NHPI * DEM
Foreclosure * NH Black * OTH
Foreclosure * NH Black * DEM
Foreclosure * Hispanic/Latino * OTH
Foreclosure * Hispanic/Latino * DEM
Voter Decade of Birth & Sex
Borrower Income & Loan Controls
R2
N

(3)

–
−0.001
(0.011)
−0.005
(0.616)
0.020*
(0.008)

NH Asian/NHPI * OTH

Ever in Foreclosure
Foreclosure

(2)

with Latino Democrats ever in foreclosure. The point estimate implies a 9.2 percentage
point gap (p < .05) in inactive voter status compared to White Republicans ever in foreclosure and a 13.8 point gap versus White Republicans never in foreclosure. These gaps
estimated for Latino Democrats ever in foreclosure remain essentially the same, at 9.9
and 14.2 points, respectively, even after controlling for borrower income, marital status,
and other signiﬁcant factors in column (4).
Figure 3 depicts the predicted estimates of the inactive voter share for Whites and
Latinos by party and foreclosure status based on the ﬁnal estimates in Table 3. Net of
other factors, White Democrats and Latino Republicans are least likely to be inactive,
only about 5%, regardless of foreclosure status. Likewise, similar shares of White Republicans are estimated to be inactive voters; the share for White Republicans in foreclosure is
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Figure 3. Regression-adjusted inactive voter share by party and ever in foreclosure (FC), matched
sample of non-Hispanic white and Hispanic/Latino registered voters, Orange County, FL, 2015 (See
Table 3 for full results).

higher, but the conﬁdence intervals overlap, and are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent given the
sample size. The only contrast that is statistically signiﬁcant is among Latino Democrats
by foreclosure status. This predicted eﬀect has potential for greater impact because more
Latinos are registered Democrats who have also entered foreclosure: 21% of sample Latino
homeowner voters are Democrats ever in foreclosure, versus only 9% of White voters.
Being underwater or having negative equity is more common than foreclosure. While
33% of White borrowers entered foreclosure, 55% ended their loans in negative equity by
2016. Similarly, 50% of Latino borrowers entered foreclosure, and an astounding 68%
ended with negative equity. Figure 4 depicts estimates of voter inactivity from Table 4
after replacing the foreclosure variable as an indicator for lost wealth with a variable for
underwater or negative equity status (see online supplement). The eﬀect of underwater
status among Latinos not aﬃliated with the two major parties is signiﬁcant. The estimates
suggest that these unaﬃliated Latino voters are over three times as likely to be inactive if
they end up with negative equity (10.6% versus 3.3%, p < .03). About 21% of Latino voters
were other/no party voters were underwater, compared to only 12% of White voters. The
estimates for Latino Democrats are marginally signiﬁcant (p < .13). Strikingly, Figure 4
shows there is no distinguishable diﬀerence in voter inactivity rates between White Republicans and Latino Republicans, across race or underwater status.
I now examine the last link in my conceptual chain: the eﬀects of lost household wealth
on election outcomes. Speciﬁcally, is diminished wealth related to the decrease in the
Democratic US presidential two-party vote share in Florida from 2012 to 2016? I
examine whether foreclosures and lost wealth aﬀect the net shift in Democratic vote
shares at two levels, ﬁrst, the Orange County, Florida precinct-level and, second, at the
Florida county-level. I collapse my unique panel dataset to the precinct level and estimate
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Figure 4. Regression-adjusted inactive voter share by party and positive (+) or negative (−) equity
mortgage loan status, matched sample of non-Hispanic white and Hispanic/Latino registered voters,
Orange County, FL, 2015 (See Table 3 for full results).

the shift in Democratic vote shares (net of the +3.4-point shift countywide) as a function of
race-speciﬁc aggregate percentages of ending in foreclosure, underwater, and overall inactive voter status. For inactive status, I collapse the records for all 782,299 Orange County
voters by race registered in December 2015, not just the matched sample.
Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of precinct-level net shifts in the Democratic vote
share. Other mechanisms might of course also lead to lower Democratic vote shares.
Models control for the share of adults in the precinct with a college degree, among
other factors (see Table 5). The results in column (1) suggest that the share of Black
and Latino borrowers that ended up in foreclosure or completed foreclosure by 2016
were each signiﬁcantly correlated with a negative shift, or a higher Republican vote
share. Widespread foreclosures may have depressed turnout among Black voters generally.
Any eﬀect would necessarily also entail a partisan shift because 96% of Black homeowner
voters in the sample are not registered as Republicans. Finally, the marginally signiﬁcant
(p < .06) coeﬃcient on the Latino foreclosure share is consistent with a disproportionate
increase in non-Republican Latino voter inactivity prior to the election as documented
in Figures 3 and 4.
Column (2) of Table 5 reports the controlled estimates of race-speciﬁc underwater statis
on the net shift in the Democratic vote share. The share of White borrowers underwater is
the only statistically signiﬁcant determinant. A one-standard deviation (26.9 percentage
points) increase in underwater White borrowers is associated with a 0.83 point net
decrease in the Democratic vote share from 2012 to 2016. In contrast to the pattern
among Latinos (Figure 4), a lagging housing recovery may have potentially led more
White voters to vote or switch their vote to the Republican candidate (see discussion
section). Column (3) reports estimates of the possible indirect eﬀect of aggregate inactive
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Table 5. OLS estimates of precinct-level net shift in democratic presidential election vote share in
Orange County, FL, 2012 to 2016.
(1)
Loan Delinquent/REO Repossession
Percent of White Borrowers Deliq/REO
Percent of API Borrowers Deliq/REO
Percent of Black Borrowers Deliq/REO
Percent of Latino Borrowers Deliq/REO

(2)

−0.009
(0.042)
0.026
(0.077)
−0.160*
(0.056)
−0.049+
(0.027)

Home Underwater (Negative Equity)
Percent of White Borrowers Underwater

Percent of Black Borrowers Underwater
Percent of Latino Borrowers Underwater
Inactive Voters in 2015
Percent of API Voters Inactive
Percent of Black Voters Inactive
Percent of Latino Voters Inactive

Percent of Voters Registered Democrats
Percent of Adults with College Degree
Percent Owner-occupied Homes
Percent Change in Home Equity
Adjusted R 2
N

0.002
(0.001)
0.048
(0.039)
0.196***
(0.026)
−0.022
(0.015)
0.013**
(0.005)
0.37
208

(4)
0.002
(0.044)
0.039
(0.083)
−0.118*
(0.057)
−0.036
(0.029)

−0.031**
(0.012)
0.009
(0.008)
−0.009
(0.008)
−0.008
(0.010)

Percent of API Borrowers Underwater

Precinct Control Variables
Percent of Voters Age 65 or Older

(3)

0.002
(0.001)
−0.018
(0.033)
0.185***
(0.026)
−0.030*
(0.014)
0.017***
(0.005)
0.37
208

−0.027*
(0.012)
0.002
(0.009)
−0.004
(0.008)
−0.001
(0.010)
0.150**
(0.049)
0.084
(0.051)
−0.182**
(0.070)

0.131**
(0.050)
0.075
(0.052)
−0.150*
(0.071)

0.002
(0.001)
0.017
(0.032)
0.192***
(0.024)
−0.015
(0.019)
0.007
(0.005)
0.38
208

0.003*
(0.001)
0.035
(0.040)
0.175***
(0.026)
−0.014
(0.019)
0.013**
(0.005)
0.40
208

Ordinary least squares coeﬃcients (standard errors) ***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05 +p < .06 (two-tailed tests). See paper for
data sources.

voter shares by race.7 One unexpected result is the sign on the coeﬃcient associated with
the share of Asian/NHPI voters who are inactive, which warrants further review, but is
beyond the scope of my analysis. As anticipated, a large (−0.182) and statistically signiﬁcant (p < .01) coeﬃcient is associated with the percent of registered Latino voters that are
inactive.
Column (4) of Table 5 combines the race-speciﬁc interactions of foreclosure, negative
equity, and voter inactivity into a ﬁnal model. The share of Black borrowers ending in foreclosure, White borrowers underwater, and inactive Latino registered voters all remain statistically signiﬁcant and in the anticipated direction. Across models in Table 5, the percent
of adults with a college degree is a signiﬁcant, leading predictor of the net shift in the
Democratic vote share, lending the models face validity and contributing to the R 2
value of 0.40. The overall change in home equity for all borrowers, a product of initial
wealth and home price recovery, remains modestly (0.013), but signiﬁcantly associated
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(p < .01) with the net shift in precinct Democratic vote shares. The results suggest that the
housing market recovery inﬂuences the net swing in the Democratic voter share from 2012
to 2016, even after controlling for well-established explanatory variables like educational
attainment.
I have documented three pathways whereby the changes in housing wealth inﬂuence
voter activity and outcomes in Orange County: foreclosure, negative equity, and voter
inactivity. I now investigate to what extent trends across all Florida counties are consistent
with precinct- and individual-level evidence presented thus far. Figure 5 plots the shift in
Democratic two-party vote shares from 2012 to 2016 against the change in home values
since the peak of the housing boom in June 2004 to June 2016 for Florida counties. The
correlation is highly signiﬁcant (t = 9.35). Though modest (0.20), the slope is steep
enough to be a contributing cause in a close election. Home prices in the more populous
have recovered more than in the less populous counties, conﬁrming the pattern in
Figure 1. This correlation does not account for factors that may drive both trends, such
as education and racial composition, and is still potentially spurious.
Table 6 reports the county-level estimates of the shift in the Democratic vote share as a
function of the overall home price recovery and White- and Latino-speciﬁc county foreclosure rates from Rugh and Hall (2016). In the baseline model in column (1), the three
housing-related measures are all signiﬁcant and substantial, explaining close to half the
variance. The sign on the White foreclosure coeﬃcient is unexpected, implying more foreclosures lead to a higher Democratic vote share. However, White foreclosure rates peaked
later in the crisis and corresponded to later recovery in many areas. It also remains to be

Figure 5. Florida county-level change in home values since 2004 and shift in democratic presidential
vote share, 2012–2016. Data sources: Florida Division of Elections, Federal Home Finance Agency
(FHFA), Author calculations.
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seen if this eﬀect persists net of controls. As anticipated, rising home prices correspond to
more Democratic votes while higher Latino foreclosure rates imply fewer Democratic
votes.
The model in column (2) of Table 6 adds two leading rival explanations: the share of
White adults with a college degree and percent of the population that is Latter-day
Saint (LDS or Mormon); each predict signiﬁcant positive shifts in the Democratic vote
share relative to 2012 (Silver 2016, 2017). After adding these controls, the fraction of variance explained rises from 0.49 to 0.72. Home prices remain signiﬁcant, yet the magnitude
is reduced by about two-thirds, to 0.162. However, the magnitude of Hispanic foreclosure
rates point estimate only declines slightly, from −0.449 to −0.386. The model results in
column (3) repeat the analysis in column (2), except that the FHFA home price index
is replaced by the Zillow.com price index, a more volatile index arguably more reﬂective
of the dramatic housing boom and bust in Florida. The broad pattern of results is robust to
this alternative measure and the precision is increased. Given the unavailability of Zillow.com data for 14 less populous counties, column (5) presents a ﬁnal model speciﬁcation
using the FHFA index and the share of the overall population that is White. The coeﬃcients on FHFA home price index and Latino foreclosure rates remain signiﬁcant (p
< .05) and little changed in magnitude, at 0.226 and −0.313, respectively. The eﬀect of
White foreclosure rates becomes insigniﬁcant and the White percent college-educated
variable remains the leading predictors of increased Democratic vote shares. The ﬁnal
model introduces the share of the population that is White, and the share of Hispanics
that are Cuban origin. Each of these vital control variables predicts signiﬁcantly lower
Democratic voter shares, per expectations.

Table 6. Florida county-level OLS estimates of shift in democratic presidential election two-party vote
share, 2012 to 2016.
(1)
Housing Crisis
Change in FHFA Home Price Index, 2004–2016

0.472***
(0.076)

(2)
0.162*
(0.077)

Change in Zillow Home Value Index, 2004–2016
Non-Hispanic White Foreclosure Rate, 2011
Hispanic/Latino Foreclosure Rate, 2011
Rival Explanations
Percent of White Adults w/College Degree, 2010
Percent Latter-day Saint (LDS), 2010
Percent Democratic Vote Share, 2012

2.662***
(0.803)
−0.449*
(0.175)

(3)

(4)
0.226**
(0.067)

1.275*
(0.634)
−0.386**
(0.134)

0.199**
(0.059)
1.775**
(0.636)
−0.296*
(0.132)

0.424***
(0.074)
2.182*
(0.944)
−2.034
(5.121)

0.518***
(0.056)
3.398**
(1.208)
−5.196
(5.337)

1.068
(0.554)
−0.313*
(0.119)
0.401***
(0.057)
2.435**
(0.802)

−0.085**
(0.032)
Percent Cuban Origin, Hispanics, 2010
−0.152**
(0.048)
0.49
0.72
0.79
0.79
Adjusted R 2
N
54
54
45
54
Ordinary least squares coeﬃcients (standard errors) ***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05 (two-tailed tests). Data sources: Florida
Division of Elections, Federal Housing Finance Administration, Zillow.com, 2010 U.S. Census, Association of Religion Data
Archives Religious Congregations & Membership Study, and Rugh and Hall (2016).

Percent White, 2010
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In summary, the combined eﬀects of the already established class, religious, racial, and
ethnic origin rival explanation variables in Table 6 reduce – but do not erase – the substantial eﬀects of house prices and Latino foreclosures on the Democratic vote shift in
Florida. If the county home price index were increased by one standard deviation and
Latino foreclosure rates were decreased by one standard deviation, the size of the shift
in the partisan vote share from 2012 to 2016 would decrease by 49%, or almost half. By
comparison, for a one standard deviation decline in the White education variable, it
would decline by 64%.

Discussion
In this article, I have endeavoured to uncover the mechanisms that erase Latino home
equity and jeopardise the social mobility of the nation’s largest minority group. I ﬁnd
that low initial levels of home equity and higher levels of undocumented identiﬁcation
(including undocumented status) are two principal pathways whereby Latinos experienced the largest declines in household wealth in the Orlando region. My analysis
conﬁrms the well-known mechanism of equity risk, while my unique data on undocumented identiﬁcation and foreclosure represent an original contribution to the literature on
Latino residential stratiﬁcation.
The causes and consequences of lost Latino home equity also matter are not conﬁned to
Latino households. This research documents the direct and indirect links between vanishing Latino wealth and vanishing Democratic votes that played a contributing role in
ﬂipping Florida from a blue state to a red state in the recent 2016 US presidential election.
The ﬁnal mechanism I uncover is a diﬀerential eﬀect of lost equity and foreclosure on
Latino voters by partisan registration: Home foreclosure and negative equity predict
decreases in voter activity among Latino Democrats and Latino Independents, respectively, but not among Latino Republicans. Therefore, lost wealth shifted the relative composition of Latino voters such that the Latino Republican share increased, which translates
into a higher-than-expected Republican vote share, which is exactly what happened in the
2016 presidential election.
Overall, three important ﬁndings emerge from my analysis.
First, I ﬁnd that the disadvantaged wealth and immigrant proﬁle of Latinos help explain
why 27% lost their homes to foreclosure in the Orlando, Florida area, versus 18% of Blacks,
and 15% of Whites and Asian/Paciﬁc Islanders. Latinos had the least initial home equity
and over two-thirds of Latino owners ended up with negative equity by 2016, a higher fraction than any other group. Multivariate analysis conﬁrmed that negative equity was associated with a much signiﬁcantly higher risk of foreclosure for Latinos, even compared to
Whites. Income does not account for these disparities, but immigrant status appears to
play a key role. Across groups, documented immigrants with passports and legal permanent residency are least vulnerable to foreclosure. Analyses conﬁrm that Latinos with
undocumented identiﬁcation are by far the most vulnerable, followed by Latinos with
driver’s licenses, but who are not registered to vote. These ﬁndings contribute to the existing literature by documenting direct evidence that Latino immigrant and civic incorporation raise the risk of foreclosure and forgone household wealth accumulation.
Second, home foreclosure and negative equity predict signiﬁcant decreases in voter
activity among Latino Democrats and Latino Independents, respectively, but not among
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Latino Republicans. I ﬁnd no other additional signiﬁcant interactions by race, party, and
foreclosure or negative equity status in my multivariate analysis of the matched homeowner-voter individual-level data. At the Orange County (Orlando) precinct-level, I
combine aggregate data on over 780,000 voters and ﬁnd that the proportion inactive of
all Latino voters is a strong and signiﬁcant determinant of a reduction, relative to 2012,
in the Democratic two-party vote share in the 2016 US presidential election. A one-standard deviation change (7.9 percentage points) in the share of inactive Latino voters leads to
a decrease in the net Democratic vote share by 1.43 points, about 42% the size of the mean
precinct-level swing, 3.4 points. I also ﬁnd that decreases in precinct-level home equity,
increases in White owners underwater, and increases in Black foreclosures predict a negative shift or reduction in the Democratic vote share from 2012 to 2016. Just as rising integration of Blacks and Latinos made them vulnerable to risky lending (e.g. Fischer and
Tienda 2006; Hwang, Hankinson, and Brown 2015), ensuing foreclosures among Blacks
could plausibly aﬀect voting activity and turnout among Latino neighbours, a possibility
that merits further study.
Third, I ﬁnd corroborating evidence for individual- and precinct-level links between the
housing crisis and swings in the 2016 election. Lagging home values and Latino foreclosures predict signiﬁcantly lower Democratic presidential candidate vote shares relative
to 2012. The eﬀects are not trivial. A one-standard deviation change in each would
together reduce the magnitude of the vote swing by almost half. Notably, adding established rival explanations to the model reduce, but fail to erase, the substantial eﬀects of
house price changes and Latino foreclosures on the Democratic vote shift in Florida,
whether class (percent White college educated), religious (percent LDS), racial (percent
White), or ethnic origin (percent Cuban origin Hispanic) variables. The persistence of
the signiﬁcant eﬀect of Latino foreclosure rates after controlling for percent Cuban
origin strengthens my argument for two additional reasons. First, Cuban areas experienced fewer foreclosures (Cahill and Franklin 2013); second, Cuban American voters
were more likely to vote for the Republican candidate than in 2012 (Valdes 2016).
While I have not yet collected the statewide data necessary to directly test the mediating
eﬀect of non-Republican Latino voter inactivity, the ﬁndings on Latino foreclosures are
consistent with that hypothesis.8
Taken together, the ﬁndings here suggest that vanishing wealth in the housing crisis led
to vanishing Democratic votes by (1) deactivating Latino Democrats and Latino Independents, but not Latino Republicans; (2) depressing turnout in minority areas with more
Black foreclosures; and (3) potentially activating voters, mainly Whites, in areas that
lagged in the housing recovery where more White homeowners were underwater.9 The
evidence is consistent with other research that ﬁnds White voters who perceived themselves to be left behind in the economic recovery were more likely to vote for the Republican candidate, including White Democrats who switched votes from 2012 to 2016
(Rothwell and Diego-Rosell 2016; Zonta and Edelman 2016).10
This article makes several contributions to the literature on residential racial stratiﬁcation and the housing crisis. It advances beyond the beyond Black/White binary in examining the determinants of housing wealth among an unusually diverse Latino population
in an emerging immigrant gateway with a signiﬁcant Puerto Rican diaspora. It is also the
ﬁrst study that establishes speciﬁc connections between the racially and geographically
uneven housing recovery and the 2016 election. Notwithstanding these contributions,
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the analysis has potential shortcomings. The borrower identiﬁcation proxy for immigrant
status is directly observed, but obscures overlapping categories such as borrowers who
refuse to disclose their identiﬁcation and undocumented immigrants. The panel data do
not record vote choice at individual level, only the ecological level. Future research
should focus on the potentially pivotal role of mixed status households and the
inﬂuence of wealth holdings in countries of origin (Flippen 2019; Keister, Vallejo, and
Smith 2019). The data here only recorded a handful of such couples based on identiﬁcation type, surely an understatement. Moreover, voter inactivity, while recorded in
proper post-crisis time order, should be adjusted for past inactivity, and should be examined for all precincts in Florida, not just in the Orlando area, in order to uncover potentially important cleavages among Cuban American and other voters.

Conclusion
The racial position of Latinos in the uneven housing crisis recovery illustrates how the
colour line continues to evolve and stratify society on the basis of race. The stunning evaporation of wealth harmed not only harmed vulnerable Latino immigrants; it also structured the exclusion of Latino voters and helped shift Florida from a blue state in 2012
to a red state in 2016. In majority-minority Orlando, and rapidly diversifying Florida,
these ﬁndings are a reminder that Latinos’ impending ‘numerical majority does not translate to equality’ (Flores-González 2017, 4).
My analysis also has implications for Latino political engagement. I ﬁnd that Latino
Republican voters appear to respond more like other (White) Republicans than other
Latinos, which holds important racial and electoral implications as the Latino share of
the population continues to rise. The results of the recent 2018 general election in
Florida bolster my ﬁndings. First, there is a near perfect correlation (r = 0.99) between
the county-level Democratic vote share in the 2016 presidential election and the 2018
US Senate election (Author’s calculations; see also Isbell 2018). Second, the swing
towards Democratic statewide candidates in Florida was less than one point compared
to the statewide presidential election, far less than the national swing in federal election
contests (e.g. +9 points towards Democrats in US House races). Third, the persistence
of Republican voting among Florida Latino voters diﬀered from Texas, where there are
also a substantial number of (mainly Mexican American) Latino Republicans, but a historic swing towards Democratic candidates (Krogstad, Flores, and Lopez 2018). Recent
scholarship has argued that long-awaited increases in Latino voter turnout in 2016 (and
2018) may be the harvest of seeds planted by the largest immigrant rights demonstrations
in US history in 2006 (Zepeda-Millán 2017). However, results from 2016 and 2018
strongly suggest that a more entrenched pattern of partisanship has taken hold among
Florida voters, including Latinos. In Florida, there are relatively few Mexican origin
Latinos, yet a disproportionately higher share of Puerto Ricans (more Democratic yet
less active), and Cubans and South Americans (more Republican and more active).
This mix of Latino nationalities, partisanship, and voter activity stands out yet informs
the future of elections elsewhere because the century-long wave of Mexican immigration
is over and the US Latino population is becoming more native born and less Mexican and
with each passing year. To be sure, in the present political climate of anti-immigrant sentiment expressed by Republican elected oﬃcials, Latinos (and Asians, women, and college-
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educated Whites) have swung towards Democratic candidates, but the 2018 results in
Florida warn against extrapolating that trend forever into the future, when the Latino
population may look very diﬀerent.
Latino racial incorporation in the wake of the housing crisis and recent elections may
further solidify a tri-racial divide (Bonilla-Silva 2017; Vargas 2015). In Florida, a Latino
racial upper tier remains a relative smaller segment oriented around conservative white
racial ideology (e.g. older Cuban voters and leaders like Marco Rubio). Meanwhile, a
rapidly growing racial middle increases its power to swing future elections (e.g. newly
arrived, self-identiﬁed White Puerto Rican and South American suburbanites). A ﬁnal
tier of Latinos remain politically and economically excluded. The exclusion may take
the form of de jure disenfranchisement via immigration policy or de facto marginalisation
as the crisis reproduces racial gaps in wealth and social mobility. Understanding Latino
wealth accumulation and tracing its impact on Latino racial incorporation remains an
important task for future research and a pressing concern for US politics and society.

Notes
1. By comparison, only about 10% of all Latinos in the US are Puerto Rican (US Census Bureau
2017).
2. Pfeiﬀer and Morris (2017) do not uncover any signiﬁcant eﬀects of homeownership at
diﬀering stages of the housing boom, bust, and recovery on civic neighbourhood activities;
however, their data do not allow them to examine voting participation or diﬀerences by race.
3. In Florida and 22 other states foreclosure is a judicial procedure (Lis Pendens ﬁling). Among
the matched dataset, the average time from an initial Lis Pendens ﬁling to completed foreclosure and home repossession was 890 days, an important detail I return to in my discussion of
Florida versus non-judicial foreclosure states, such as Arizona.
4. Further details about the match criteria for each of these data set merges may be found in the
online supplement.
5. The pattern of results that I uncover is broadly consistent using logistic, probit, multinomial,
and hazard modelling approaches (available upon request).
6. I estimate OCLTV for purchase loans using merged property sales records at the parcel level
from the Orange County Property Appraiser. For securitised loans, I use merged loan-level
OCLTV from Private Label and Government Sponsored Enterprise mortgage backed securities records (N = 4,288; see Rugh and Allen 2015). Original home equity is the diﬀerence
between the value of the property value minus the combined ﬁrst and second loan
balance. Upon prepayment, foreclosure, or December 2016, end CLTV is available from
securities data or imputed based on zip code home price changes, ARM terms and rates,
amortisation, and length of delinquency (see online appendix for more details).
7. Due to multi-collinearity, I am unable to include the (insigniﬁcant) percent White voter inactive variable.
8. Other heavily Latino Sunbelt states present an instructive counterfactual scenario for what
may have transpired if there were a stronger (or weaker) recovery in home values in
Florida. Latinos make up 25% of the population in Florida, 29% in Nevada, 31% in
Arizona, and 39% in California and Texas. Based on my ﬁndings, a stronger housing recovery, more in line with most of these peer states, would imply fewer Latino foreclosures,
smaller reductions in wealth, fewer inactive non-Republican Latino voters, and an increased
Democratic vote share in 2016. In Florida, the weighted average of county home prices
increased by 14% from 2004 to 2016 and the Democratic vote share decreased by 2 points
from 2012 to 2016. In Arizona, California, and Texas, weighted home prices increased by
21, 24, and 46%, respectively, in the counties with available data (14 of 15 in Arizona, 55
of 58 in California, 144 of 254 in Texas). As the recovery ﬁgures suggest, among these
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three states, the weighted Democratic vote share increased by 5 points, 6 points, and 6 points,
respectively, in counties with available home price data. Thus, unlike Florida, the Democratic
vote share did not decrease in Arizona, California, or Texas, where exit polls reported a
similar share of Latinos voting for the Republican candidate as in Florida (CNN 2016).
Unlike these states, the housing market in Nevada has been weaker than in Florida and
has not recovered; home prices have decreased by 3%. As expected, the Democratic vote
share also declined more than in Florida, by 4 points. This counterfactual comparison,
partly explains why, all else equal, Arizona, California, and Texas trended more Democratic,
but Florida and Nevada did not. To be sure, shifts in the 2016 election outcome have multiple
causes, including the class, religious, and racial proﬁle of the population. However, this comparison strongly suggests the housing market recovery helped played a role and warrants
further investigation.
9. Other evidence supports the notion that foreclosures and vanishing home equity inﬂuenced
the election outcome mainly by tilting the composition of Florida voters in 2016 towards
White and Latino Republican voters. First, it is highly unlikely that the housing fallout systematically aﬀected the widespread, uniform, and steep drop-oﬀ in Black voter turnout
nationwide and across Florida precincts and counties (File 2017; Florida Division of Elections
2017). Second, in my matched homeowner-voter dataset, partisanship varies by Hispanic
surname status. Speciﬁcally, 18% of Latinos with a Hispanic surname are registered as a
Republican, versus 27% among those without a Hispanic surname. Hispanic surname
status is simultaneously a marker of immigrant integration, intermarriage, and racial integration into the non-Hispanic white mainstream as well as risk factor for foreclosure (net
of controls). These cleavages by party and ethnicity underscore how the diversity of the
Latino population in Florida contributes to the disappearance of Democratic votes in
2016. Consequently, I conclude that any eﬀect of the housing crisis indeed likely hinges
on the mediating inﬂuence of non-Republican Latino voter inactivity in response to
Latino foreclosures and lost wealth and diﬀerential White voter response to the lagging
recovery.
10. In economic, psychological, political, and sociological perspective, the residual eﬀects of the
housing crisis may help explain the elevated support for the Republican candidate among
White homeowners with higher incomes and apparently more stable economic prospects
relative to the white working class. While rising household wealth confers an endowment
eﬀect that boosts consumption (Case, Quigley, and Shiller 2011), evidence from prospect
theory shows that losses are valued more than equivalent gains (Tversky and Kahneman
1991). To understand why the endowment eﬀect appears more pronounced for Whites
than non-Whites (see Table 5, Figures 3 and 4), we must assess the structural importance
of race in social and political context. As other areas and owners recover, the persistence
of time and social distance may magnify the perceived sense of loss and even spur White
resentment. In the pair of maps in Figure 1, most of the counties in Florida that have not
recovered from the housing crisis are exurban areas populated heavily by Whites but
which surround urban areas that have recovered, and are far more racially diverse. In
2012, most Florida counties had not recovered, regardless of location; by 2016, the urbanexurban/rural divide in Figure 1 had emerged. Thus, in 2016 especially, White homeowners
in areas where the housing crisis lingered, however mildly, might perceive that non-Whites
were faring better economically, even if the balance of evidence suggests otherwise. Furthermore, if Whites perceive that non-White economic success comes at the expense of Whites,
then White reaction to the housing crisis could readily be racialized, an outcome supported
by recent cutting-edge research in political science (Luttig, Federico, and Lavine Forthcoming). The racial eﬀects of time and social distance were indeed apparently ampliﬁed by a
Republican candidate campaign that deployed the Latino immigrant threat narrative at its
inception (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Enos 2017). Support would accumulate among
White voters, including aﬄuent homeowners, if oﬀered a zero sum bargain between improving their (relatively) dwindled economic prospects and the inexorable demographic increase
in the non-White population (Haney-López 2015; Major, Blodorn, and Blascovich 2016).
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Under these conditions, the only surprise would be if the response of White voters to the
crisis were not racialized by the racial appeals of the 2016 Republican campaign
(Tesler 2016).
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